


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**CASSETTE
TAPE**



DCI REMARKS

CONGRESSIONAL WOMEN'S CAUCUS
20 July 1978

Intelligence in the CIA is two things, collecting data and it is analyzing or interpreting that data. We collect data three different ways: We collect signals intelligence--I would appreciate it if you didn't take too many notes because I am going to verge over on the classified here and I don't know who is cleared and who is not. We collect signals intelligence which are emanations in the air--communications, radar, telemetry, and so on. We collect from ground stations all around the world; we collect from airplanes, we collect them from satellites. Here is where I am delicate because although everybody knows we have satellites, we are not as a nation in a position to acknowledge that publicly--we are concerned about restrictions imposed maybe by the United Nations and other people can start talking about it. I will talk about it here, but that is not something that I can acknowledge publicly.

The second form of intelligence collection is photographic. We photograph from airplanes, we photograph from satellites. When we do it this way, we call it technical intelligence collection and most of this is organized by the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the National

Reconnaissance Office. But the CIA plays an element in each of these and it is helpful to have centers of development and the CIA has played a very good role over the years in developing the technical means for getting the photographs and getting the signals. The CIA operates some of the photographic and signals intelligence, so we have people who have to have a pretty scientific bent to develop and operate these very technical systems that are becoming more technical all the time. As far as women are concerned in this area of technical collection by the CIA, there is no impediment that I see for employing women--there are no specific requirements which dictate a man. There is one limitation and that is that most of these people have degrees. There are less of those in the women population than men, but if the woman has that kind of qualifications--not quite 15% of the technical bureau in the CIA is composed of women.

Now, the third collection of intelligence is what we call human intelligence--spies. This is done primarily in our government by the CIA and just as the military has the lead in the signals and the photographic intelligence, the CIA is the reverse here. The primary human intelligence in our country is vested in the CIA. I want to explain how you run human intelligence a bit here, because it is often confused with the James Bond movies. We have two categories of people in

this business. One is case officers and the other agents. The agents is a euphemism for spies. The spies, the agents, are foreigners, they are not Americans in almost all cases. They are people we induce to work for the good of the United States and provide us information. For every agent there is a CIA case officer, someone who manages the situation, and most of those are overseas where they can be in contact. The process of this agent/case officer relationship is a very important, difficult, delicate one and it is one that I am going to describe in a little detail because there are some limitations on women here, and I want to be very frank with where they are and where they are not. There are also places where the women are better than the men. You have a CIA case officer in country "X". His or her job is to find, in accordance with the directives we have given them as to the information we are looking for--we want information on subject "X", some person in that country who will help us get that information. Now, you could be in a European country and you could be getting information from the Russians who are located there, the Chinese who are located there, the East Europeans who are located there, or the people from that country. It depends on what we have asked them to do. The case officer under the direction of the Chief of Station, says alright, they in Washington tell me they want some information

about the Chinese missile program. The case officer's job is to find somebody, whether it is an employee of the Chinese embassy, a native of that country. But to do that, you have to do three things.

First, you have to assess all the candidates, and decide which ones are likely to be recruitable. You don't want to go up to somebody who is a hardcore member of the Chinese Communist Party and tell them you work for CIA, you would end up with a diplomatic note protesting that you are interfering in their activities. You assess this person in all kinds of ways, finding people who know him or her, ask them to make contact and come back and tell you, "I heard this person say that Chinese policy wasn't very good on thus and so." Once you have made a determination that this is a likely candidate you then go to the second step which is to cultivate them, get to know them. We have case officers who spend half their life just giving dinner parties or playing tennis or doing something to make contact with the people they are trying to cultivate. Incidentally, it is not easy because most of them are working

STATINTL

[REDACTED] or whatever job we give them to obscure that they are working for the CIA. They work for us the rest of the time, largely at night. Once they have cultivated the person they then have to make that crucial decision--shall I approach them and recruit them. It isn't always black and white and it is a difficult three stage process. Now, I will go on from

here. Let me stop just a minute and say there are some limitations here on the use of women. The average woman can't go into a bar by chance at 11 o'clock at night every night for four nights in a row and try to make contact with somebody sitting on a bar stool without her becoming apparent. It is not a major limitation, but there is some problem there. The next step:

The next step is, once you have the recruit, then the case officer's job is to transmit to the agent what information we want to receive back. How you do that varies. If you are in a country where you're not under tight surveillance all the time, you could probably meet with the agent and arrange for a safe house or an apartment and so on where you can actually sit down and talk. But in Moscow, we don't come close to that. We have all kinds of electronic ways of communicating with each other, there is the physical--pass the person in the stairway of the department store, or physically pass them microfilm by hand, drop a brick on the street corner and inside the brick you have material that is delicate. Again, there are some cases here where a woman can find that certain circumstances may be easier and better. For some it is not as good to be a woman in this instance because you are out in the street at 2 o'clock in the morning in a bad section of town passing something around, you are more suspect when you walk down the street. On the other hand, there are some real advantages. You may recall a recent story in the press a couple weeks

ago about our agent, a lady named [REDACTED] who was STATINTL
caught in Moscow last July. She was just exposed a couple
STATINTL of weeks ago. [REDACTED] was sent to Moscow as a
case officer. One of the reasons she was on this case where
she got caught exchanging some material with a Soviet, was
that it was easier for us to let her get lost in the crowd
in Moscow, she was less suspect as a case officer than any
of our male CIA men who put her on the toughest case. It
wasn't her fault she got caught like this, but she did. She
is a marvelous woman. They roughed her up and she gave it
back to them and it was as tough as could be, but she held
her own.

Finally, let me wrap up with the human intelligence--we
are talking overseas. Here also there are some inhibitions
on the use of women. In Saudi Arabia it is against the law
for you girls to drive a car. There are places like that where
the ability of the woman to make contact with a male is
somewhat limited. Let me emphasize I am not saying it rules
out the use of women as case officers at all. Twenty percent
of people in our clandestine organization, who handle all this
are women. There is not as high a percentage of this overseas
as yet partly because they are coming in and moving up. This has
been a traditional male atmosphere, and there is a strong bias
against using women here. It's something that we are working
against, giving us 20% in the organization is at least a step
in the right direction. We now have to get more out into the

field into the case officer positions. Our highest ranking woman in the Central Intelligence Agency is a GS-18, the number three person in this clandestine business. In fact, the other day she was number one because the other two were out of town. She is a very capable person.

Let me now go and talk about the other half of the house which is the evaluation and interpretation side. Here we run the gamut of all kinds of specialties. It is really astounding, the number of areas of academic expertise we have to have available: very technical interpretation, medical (when we assess what the leaders of the world health is); psychiatrist (how we deal with a terrorist group that's sitting in the building over there threatening this and that); obviously political scientist; obviously economists; people who deal in nuclear power and nuclear weapons technology that determines what is going on around the world on this kind of ofthing; lots of people in military intelligence some of which is quantative analysis. The only limit to women in this interpretative and analytic area is education. If the women have the education that fits these descriptions I have just given you, there should be utterly no reason to employ them. You can see that education is a factor however, it's what women want and don't want to get into. I have divided the statistics on this into four categories. First of all, twenty percent of the professionals in analytic areas are women in the intelligence agency. The branches are technically oriented--weapons intelligence, for instance and

military intelligence--women run 8 to 11% instead of 20%. We are below the average here. When we get into the political science and economic areas then it goes up. So, obviously there is a bias here in the educational factor. Briefly, let me say that even though the non-professionals, the women in those categories, we are at or above the government average of the percentage of women in the non-professional categories. I think we are doing very well and we are emphasizing what we call upward mobility. We have six different types of upward mobility programs here. In 1977, 66 women moved up from the clerical to the professional categories and that is two-thirds of all those who didn't move up in the CIA. We are going to keep that moving even more. We are very pleased, particularly because of our security considerations, that our own employees are able to move up into the professional categories--they understand all the procedures and it is very, very helpful. Overall, one-third of our labor force at the Central Intelligence Agency is composed of women. Their average grade is two grades above the average for the government. It is difficult to compare; you would know better than I the structures of the organizations. We have only nine supergrades, which is only a small percent of our supergrades and we really have to do more to move into that. One of our problems here that some of these girls, which you can easily detect, can have lateral entry, but others can't. There is no way we can go out on the street and get a case officer off the street and bring him in as a GS-17 or 18, but a technical person in a technical

shop, we can bring those in from the outside.

Finally, we are pleased that in 1977, we got our recruitment up 50% from what it was in 1976. We had 14% of the recruits in 1976 where women it's up to 20% in 1977, we are working to keep that moving. We try to be equal opportunity employers. We are doing as well as we can and should, we are giving attention to trying. I would really appreciate your suggestions as to ways in which we can do it better or answer questions about intelligence in general.

FEDERAL WOMEN'S CAUCUS TALK

Wednesday, 20 July 1978

What do we do - how women fit in -

CIA not DCI

No auth over hiring/assign/in comm

2 Functions

Collect

Evaluate

Collect

Technical

Signals -

Ground/Air/Sat

Photos -

Air/Sat

Women - (Prof side)

Technical degrees

13.8% of DDS&T professionals are women

Human - *Reason need*

Case Officer - Agent relationship

1. Process of assessment
2. " " cultivation
3. " " recruitment

Street work
Overseas Some limits - esp. cultivation

Some limits - e.g., Saudi Arabia - *Can*

Street work - contact


Some limits - Safety - Appearance

Still also aura of man's world

20.1% DDO

roughly

 case officers overseas today

0 - COS; 1 - COB =  (3 - DCOS)

#3 leader

Evaluation

Gamut of specialties

Technical

Nuc power/weapons

Weapons systems

Medical

Technology

Political Science

Economics

Military -


Quantitative

Interpretive


Limit - Education

Background

 in NFAC

 in OSI, OWI combined

 in ORPA, OGCR combined

 in OER

Admin

Logistics, comm, ADP, Finance, Medical, Training

STATINTL

██████████ in DDA

Non-professionals

At or above Gov't average

6 upward mobility programs -

66 conversions in '77

STATINTL

██████ total

Overall

1/3 of force

Average grade 2 above Gov't (7 vice 5)

STATINTL

9 supergrades - ██████

Recruitment

'77 20% prof

up from 14% '76